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The following article is an 
i edited version of the amicus 
1 curiae brief filed with the 
1 Supreme Court of the United I 
I States in the October Term, 
1998, in the case of Benjamin 
Lee Lilly v. Commonwealth of 
Virginia (No. 98-5881). 
"This case raises important 
questions about the meaning of 
the confrontation clause, which 
has been a vital ingredient of 
the fair trial right for hundreds 
of years," Professor Richard 
Priedman and his co-authors 
say. "In particular, this case 
presents the Court with an 
opportunity to reconsider the 
relationship between the 
confrontation clause and the 
law of hearsay." On June 10 the 
Court handed down a decision 
in favor of Lilly. Justice Stephen 
Breyer, a member of the 
plurality, wrote a concurring 
opinion citing this brief 
favorably and suggested that a 
future case might call for the 
Court to adopt its approach. 
(See story on page 53.) 
The petitioner, Benjamin Lilly, was 
convicted in the Virginia Circuit Court of 
the capital murder of a student during a 
carjacking. The trial court entered 
judgmen~ on the jury's verdict on March 7, 
1997, and imposed the death sentence 
recommended by the jury The Virginia 
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and 
the sentence on April 17, 1998, in Lilly v. 
Cornnzonwenlth, 499 S.E.2d 522 (VA 1998). 
With petitioner at the time of the 
shooting were Gary Wayne Barker and 
petitioner's brother, Mark Lilly At the 
petitioner's trial, Barker, who had been 
allowed to plead guilty and to avoid the 
death penalty, testified against him; Mark 
Lilly, who had not been tried or allowed to 
plead, invoked his privilege against self- 
incrimination. The court then admitted the 
in-custody confession given by Mark Lilly 
to the police in which he named his 
brother as the triggerman. Mark Lilly was 
subsequently permitted to plead guilty to 
noncapital murder, and recanted portions 
of his confession at petitioner's sentencing. 
On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court 
held that Mark Lilly's in-custody confession 
had been properly admitted as a statement 
against interest under a "firmly rooted" 
Virginia hearsay exception, and that the 
confession therefore satisfied the 
confrontation clause. 
This case presents the Court with an 
opportunity to restore the confrontation 
clause to its proper place as one of the 
fundamental guarantees protected by the 
Constitution, one with deep roots in the 
Anglo-American tradition, and indeed, 
throughout Western jurisprudence. 
Decisions of this Court have tended to 
merge the confrontation right with the 
ordinary law of hearsay, perceiving both as 
principally guarantors of the reliability of 
evidence. 
This approach, we submit, has not 
worlted. It denigrates the confrontation 
right and the fundamental sense of 
procedural fairness that the right protects. 
It ignores the language of the clause, the 
history of the right, and the role of the 
right in the Sixth Amendment. It provides 
insufficient guidance and affords too much 
discretion to lower courts in interpreting 
the confrontation clause. It simultaneously 
leads to overly rigid hearsay lam7 The price 
to our system of justice is exemplified by 
intolerable results such as the one reached 
by the court below in this case. 
We believe that it is necessary to break 
the link between confrontation and hearsay, 
both so that s rob us^ understanding ol the 
confrontatior! right can be developed and 
so that ordinary hearsay law will not be 
confused by an imposed correspondence 
with a right that has been inadequately 
articulated. A majority of this Court, in 
M ~ i t e  v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353 (1992), 
rejected a proposal by the government to 
uncouple the confrontation clause from the 
hearsay rule as an "argument . . . [that] 
comes too late in the day," but that 
conclusion was apparently based primarily 
on the Court's concern that the 
government's reading of the clause "would 
virtually eliminate its role in restricting the 
admission of hearsay testimony" 
By contrast, the approach we present 
here would reinvigorate the clause, giving 
it force independent of hearsay law At the 
same time, though our approach is 
markedly different analytically from the 
current doctrine, the results of our 
approach would, at least for the most 
part, square with those reached in the 
Court's decisions. 
The most crucial step in achieving a 
better sense of tlze confrontation clause is 
recognizing its unique purpose. The Sixth 
Amendment provides: "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with witnesses 
against hm."  The concerns that led to the 
confrontation clause predate modem 
hearsay law. Two consequences flow from 
this acknowledgement. First, if a declarant 
is acting as a witness - whether in or out 
of court - the clause undeniably applies 
and violations of its core principles cannot 
be excused on the basis of hearsay 
exceptions. Second, not every hearsay 
declaration raises a confrontation clause 
issue. Within its proper realm, we believe 
the confrontation clause states a simple and 
categorical rule, which is central to the 
Anglo-American concept of justice: the 
accused has a light to confront all adverse 
witnesses. This means, at the very least, 
the right to cross-examine the witness 
under oath. 
We will present in this brief some 
varying understandings of what the term 
"witnesses" should be understood to mean 
in the clause. Formulating a precise 
definition is not a simple matter, but under 
any plausible definition, Mark Lilly was 
acting as a witness within the meaning of 
the clause when he made the crucial 
accusation in this case. The admission of 
such statements sets up, in elcect, an 
inquisitorial system in which prosecutors 
are free to take unsworn statements from 
witnesses behind closed doors, out of the 
presence of the accused or of counsel, who 
are given no opportunity for cross- 
examinaton, and tihen use those statexrients 
to convict a dekndkt - d because of 'he  
courts' perception that su* testimony is 
trusrworthy This practice was recognized 
to be unacceptable long before the 
confrontation clause was adopted. And it is 
at the very qpre of what the clause was 
meant to prevent. Just as the rights to trial - 
by jury andito counsel are not qualified by 
the courtk evaluation of the merits of the 
case, the right to confront the witness $ 
not quahfied by the court? evaluation of 
the accuracy nf the witness' statement. 
Anglo-American traditions, civilized 
practice, and the structure of the Smth 
knendment call for a categorical right to 
confrontation independenLof the hearsay 
doctrine. The right of an accused to 
, confront the witnesses against him 
... 8 a ~el's0Il aS a ~ I ~ M ~ S S  predates, and is hdepedent of, the law of 
A hearsay It has received its fullest 
against an accused' the accused development w i b  the Anglo-American 
must have an 0pp0-V to tradition, but it has also been a critical 
m&nt that person feature of other judicial systems, which 
have n o k g  resembhg our law of 
hearsay The history and broad recognition- 
of the confrontation right demonstrate that 
it is not an adjunct of, or an attempt to 
constitutio&e, the law of hear* Rather, 
it is a fundamental and ~ate~orical~rule as 
to how the testimony of wiGesses should 
be taken. 
The right to confrontation has a long 
history that antedates the hearsay rule. The 
ancient Hebrews required accusing 
witnesses to give their testimony in front of 
the accused. So did the Romans. When 
medieval continental systems began to rely 
on the testimony of witnesses, they allowed 
the parties to examine the witnesses - but 
on written questions. These systems took 
the testimony behind closed doors, for fear 
that witnesses would be coached or 
intimidated. 
By contrast, the open and 
confrontational way in which teshony 
was taken was the mast critical 
characteristic of the common law trial. In 
the middle of the 16th century, Sir Thomas 
Smith wrote a well-known account of a 
typical English crimBal trial, which he 
-- 
described as an a&-& be @,-&? h accuihg witness and the ecms - $. 
~ e g h h n g  m ~ l y  r centpry bche S~&;;F 
wrote, mb con+uing kor centuries 
 afterward^, numerow ~agl~djuciges ( 
comrnentatora praised the upen d '; 
confrontational mark of the En* trial 
in contrast to itsr04tinentd count:qiwt, c 
Foracample, Sir Matthew ~ d l e  huded !; 
the " o h  Course of E~depce.tu the Jury 
in the h e n c e  of pe ~ u d b ,  Jq Plrticq - 
and Council" in Eriglish procedum. h o K g  
other advan@es,&is procedure allowed - '  
*Opportunity for all Persons concern'd" to 
question the wimess and "oP$o~tunity of - 
confronting the adverse Witnesses." In a ' 
passage closely following Hale, Blaekstom 
articulated many of the same advantag& - 
including "the confronting of adyerse 
witn&esn - of "the-Engkh way of giving! 
testimony, on1 t m . "  I 
Thus, by 1696, in the celeb ted ase of 
R. v. Paine, it was clearly estaplis % ed &Bt * 
even if a witness had died,'his statement 
k d e  to a ' j u d e  of the peace could not be, 
admitted against a misdemeanor defendant' 
because the defendant was not present i l l  
when the examination was taken and so - 
"could not axs-examine" the deponent. ti 
To be syre, the norm of confrontation 
was not always respe'cted.8 First, Paint itself 
distinguished felony cases. Since *e mid- 
16th century, justices of the peace had 
been required to examine felony witnesses, 
h d  these examinations were admissible at; 
trial if the witness was then unavailable 
and the examination was taken under oath; 
This anomalously lenient treatment - I 
which was probably one of the aKuses at ' 
which the confrontation clause was aimed - 
- was controversial by the early 17th - 
century, and it was eliminated by stature iii ' 
the 19th century 
Second, a set of courts in England, 
including the equity courts, followed the i 
continental system rather than the I 
common law, relying largely on'testbynyi 
taken out of court and, out of the presence! 
of the parties. These courts appeared to be 
arms of unlimited royal power, and so ' 
many of them, notably thecourt of Star ' 
Chamber, did not survive ihe upheavals of 
the 17th century 
f i r d ,  the crown, eager to use the 
criminal law as a means of contr01hg its : 
adversaries, sometimes used testimony-. 
taken out of the presence of the accused. 
Thus, it is in the treason cases of Tudor and 
Stuart England thal we find the battle for 
the confrontation right most clearly fought. 
As early as 1521, treason defendants, 
often using the term "face to face," 
demanded  hat the witnesses be brought 
before them. Sometimes these demands 
were heeded, sometimes not - but what is 
most notable is that they found recurrent 
support in acls of Parliament, which 
repeatedly required that accusing witnesses 
be brought "face to face" with (he 
defendanl. By the middle of the 17th 
century, the battle was won, and courts 
clearly understood that treason witnesses 
must testify before the accused, subject to 
questions by the accused. 
Well into that century, prosecutorial 
authorities often tried to use confessions of 
alleged accomplices of the accused that 
were not made according to the usual 
norms of testimony, under oath and before 
the accused. The case of Sir Walter Raleigh 
is the most notorious, but far from the only 
one. The theory - remarkably similar to 
the one adopted by the lower court in this 
case - was that self-accusation was "as 
strong as if upon oath." But the judges 
soon realized the iniquity of allowing an 
exception to the usual noims of testimony 
simply because the accomplice accused 
himself as well as another. 
In 1662, shortly after the Restoration, 
the judges of the King's Bench ruled 
unaninlously and definitively that, though 
a pretrial confession was "evidence against 
the Party himself who made the 
Confession" and, if adequately proved, 
could indeed support conviction of that 
person without witnesses to the reason 
itself, the confession "cannot be used as 
evidence against any others whom on his 
Examination he confessed to be in the 
Treason." This fundamental piinciple seems 
never since to have been seriously 
challenged until recently - in cases like 
the current one. 
The conlrontation right naturally round 
its way to America. Thus, a Massaclzusetts 
statute of 1647 provided that "in all capital 
cases all witnesses shall be present 
wheresoever they dwell." But the 
Americans did not simply draw on English 
law. American criminal procedure 
developed in a distinctive way The right to 
counsel in felony trials developed far more 
quickly in America than in England, and 
with it rose an adversarial spirit that made 
the opportunity for confrontation of 
~dverse witnesses especially crucial. In 
addition, the right became especially 
relevant to American concerns when 
Parliament began in the 1760s to regulate 
the colonists through inquisitorial means 
like the Stamp Act, which provided for the 
examination of witnesses upon 
interrogatories. I t  is clear that the framers 
were aware of the abuses in the 16th and 
17th century treason trials of the 
defendants' demands for meeting their 
accusers "face to face." They knew as well 
about the procedural reforms achieved by 
the Glorious Revolution, which included 
requiring treason to be proved through the 
testimony of two trial witnesses. 
In the Revolutionary period, the right to 
confrontation was frequently expressed, 
especially in the early state constitutions. 
Some used the time-honored "face to face" 
phrase; others, following Hale and 
Blackstone, adopted language strikingly 
similar to that later used in the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth 
Amendment. 
Note that in this account of the 
background of the Confrontation Clause, 
we have not mentioned reliability To be 
sure, one of the advantages perceived by 
those who lauded the common law system 
of open confi-ontation of witnesses was its 
coiztribution to truth-determination. But 
neither in the statutes, nor in the case law, 
nor in the commentary was there a 
suggestion that, if the courts determined 
that a particular item or type of testimony 
was reliable, then the accused lost his right 
of confrontation. On the contrav, the 
confrontation principle was a categorical 
rule, a basic matter of the procedures by 
which testimony was taken. 
Similarly the law against hearsay has 
not played a role in this account. It could 
not have: Hearsay doctrine, like evidentiary 
law more generallj< was not well developed 
even at the time the clause was adopted, 
nzuch less duling the previous centuries 
As late as 1794, Edmund Burlze remai-ked 
in the House of Commons that the rules of 
"the law of evidence . . . [were] very 
general, very abstract, and comprised in so 
small a compass that a parrot he had 
knotvn might get them by rote in one half 
hour, and repeat them in live minutes." 
The tendency lo meld the confrontaiion 
right and hearsay is a he r -day  
development. I t  lilzely reflects tlze influence 
of Wigmore, who subordinated the 
confrontation iight to hearsay More recent 
commentators regard Wigmore's view as 
anachronistic because their research 
teaches that the hearsay rule evolved in 
both England and America considerably 
later than Wigmore argued. 
It is noteworthy that the word hearsay 
appears neither in Mattox I! United States 
156 U.S. 237 (1895), the first of several 
cases to note that the "piimary object" of 
the clause was to prevent the use of 
testimony taken e x  parte, nor in Poiniel- v. 
Texas 380 U.S. 400 (1965), which held 
that the clause expresses a fundanlental 
right applicable against [he states. As its 
language plainly indicates, the clause mias 
not an attempt to constitutionalize the 
nasceizt law of hearsay Rather, it plainly 
expressed the fundamental principle that if 
a person acts as a witness against an 
accused, the accused must have an 
opportunity to confront that person. 
Our historical discussion has s h o ~ m  
that evidentiary concerns were not a 
significant factor in adoption of the 
confrontaiion clause. Rather, the clause was 
meant to protect a categorical procedural 
light that, like the iight to counsel, Taras in 
place by the time the Bill of Rights was 
adopted. The conclusion is fortified by the 
placement of the clause in the Sixth 
Amendment. 
If one looks at the grand design of tlze 
SLxh Amendment, in accordance w ~ t h  
01-dinaiy canons of statutory analysis that 
constIue a provision as a hai~nonious 
whole, one sees a bundle of procedural 
protections for a criminal defendant that 
have more than accuracy in factlinding at 
their core. The light to counsel is 
recognized as fundamental even il it 
interferes wit11 factfinding in a particular 
case. And the light to a jury trial is not 
suspended because a judge may be more 
capable than jurors of correctly evaluating 
complicated expert tesr-imon)~, such as 
conzpeting statistical analyses of the 
significance of DNA elitdence. Nor has the 
interprelation of the Con~pulsorjr Process 
Clause turned solely on "accuracy ill 
factfinding." 
~nsemh 
of more cons~1t results 
m y  the Gxhntation &use has of 
-on tie the~w-hwi a 
late been stripped of pr/ 0 t h ~  lhrn U.S. 530 ( l 9 ~ 3 ,  &--a furthmng evidentiq objectives. We UI& 
t h c c a u t t o m ~ t h p t d l j s  
b t n r p ~ t a t i ~ n  ig ores sigdhnt values at 
the axe of the nght to admaation, anand state& " b e d m  af the hmrmy 
leads to intolerabe results that m o t  be inva1wd . . . as a qimple 'dqWm - -1s: 
adequately policed by the &ut. A caregoriaal right of cod'mnpa,tion h t ~ ~ " '  &?x&wmg that 
pexspectiw is borne out bg merit would yield m o ~  oonstsnt.ne~ults, t d b  wo kqgz a das-fa  
developments under the European eliminate the courts' need to evaluate ccmhnion d n v s e d p % i . . ~ ~ ~  
Convention on H u m  Rights. This t n x s t w ~ ~ e s ~  in applying the - G n q ~ n t l y  ~ ~ i ~ I ~  not : $1. .; 
convention c o n e  n o w  - b b  a Amad'mpt, and p e d t  tire cmtin~ing a u t ~ 1 m W y  adrhjssble ns 'my moaP! 
b y  rule. of COU~SC, bemuse most of the ded0p-t of the h m ~  rule withut even through thc ~edersl ~ules, and x: judicial systems fdhg under it do not ~quiring the o v e m b  of prior P-~B ; numebus state codifimtiom, had T ,  
have hearsay law. Bur Articles 6(1) and of the Court. The Gurt's anent  approach q m & d  the hamy mce~tiaq pi 6(3)(d) of the convention contain, - to confrontation produds ,iqtolerble declarations a interest to encow& 
-vel3r, a gened protection of a ' results, as illustrated & the case below. statements against penal I ,-( 
ah id d e f h t ' s  @t to a fair trial and The court has declared an q c t  fit V i e d  together, White. h e  lad to ,-. 
a specific pmtection of his right Zo between the hearsay rule and the citruliar masoning. White indietes that s 
examine OT h e  examined witnesses confrontation &we when the out-ofkourt when a state p M ) k  a s m e n t  th fits , g  
S@IW him." Under thse pmvisions, the statement a "findly h a A y  within pn exception that is "firmly rooted" -, 
European Court of H u m  Rights has exception. (The court has said that "a - i.e., widely accepted by th stat9 for ? 
m e d  a seda of decisions %ndy rooted' hearsay exception is so some time, and p~sent  in tfie \ eddhl .I 
right of confrontation, which it hss ref& ~ ~ o ~ y  that dversarial testing be Rules - rmstw0rthi.n~ 'can be inferred. 
to as such. expected to add little to its reliabilityn) ' Tkus, th$ need-for confrontation I 
Thus, the Court has repeatedly held that This f o m h ,  which masquerade as a disappeas - even if the exception was ' 1 :  
defendants' confrontation rights were ~ategoriical rule that results in consistent m d e d  by the rules themselves beyond ; 
violated by the use at trial of statements interpretations of a b e  constitutional prier law and -if the particular 
. 1 
made before trial to investigative or W t ,  instead @ves lower ~ u h s  ~ O ~ O U S  application is poorly grounded in the 1: 
proseatorial authorities, where the leeway to beam)' a&awt a ~~1 rationale om exception. Lee says that m 
defimcht had no opportunity to examine defendant, subject to correction only in the inherently un tm~or thy  statement camm 
the witness. And the E n g M  Court of rare instance in which this Court %rants be automwJly admitted aj n 
Appeal has recently &d on the same cerEioruri rootedn even if the exception under which,: 
provisions of the convention in r e a m  a The test to be used:in determining it is offered been genemny accepted hr 
similar condusion. when an exception is "fhdy rooted" is far a while, and is hcopmkd  in h e  F e w  
We thus face the great irony that the from clear. In White (502 U.S. at 357), Rules. Taken together, these ~ a s e s  beg the 
confrontation @t, one of the great glories the Court dfimed the Illinois courts - question of how a court should sspond 
of t& Anglo-American system of criminal ~ d m o n  of statem- made in the when reviewing evidence proffwd under $ 
procedu~, is now receiving its clearest of receiving medical care that idenufied the refash* traditioml c k  d p t i o n ,  m4 
a2ticulation in decisions by and following a defendant as having sexually a b ~ d  a four- nontraditional c k  exception, that has 
continental court. The reasons are clear year-old child. The Court justified its been accepted for some peIjod of time in 
enough: The Em- are unencumbered ~ ~ d ~ i o n  that such statements "firmly its jurisdiction and c~thm. 
by the p e c u h  hearsay docnine of the rooted by noting-that a hearsay exception The default test of particularized 
mm isw mdtiOnn They recognize that for such statements is recogmad in the guarantees of trustworthin&ss," which 
corhntation is a categorical rule that Federal Rules of Evidence, and is Wdely a p p b  when a exception is not fumy 
exp- a fundamental human right. accepted among the states." But before the rooted, also fa& to offer mficim gui&nae 
Federal Rules' enactment in 1975, the or to prorect a defendant adequately,as this 
exception generally &d mt include I case illustrates. Nothing in the actual ' 
statements such as the one involved in ho1dm.g of Lke barsa court from admitting 
White, describing inju* muse, even if an accomplice's confession, such as the 
relevant to dqposis or treatment s t a k m t  in this case, if it comludes that 
Moreover, numemus post-White c~urts , the par t iah confession is sufficiently 
have admitted statements under c m r  of =liable. So long as thc Court.retains iwc 
the exception a+ over confrontation t r u s w o ~  view of confrontation, and, 
~ 
clause objections even though the does not abandon Lee in favor of a per sc 
uustwo- mtionale of the mpt ion  rule that certain kinds of conf"om-pevei 
was not satisfled because the declarant was 
I I 
too young to appreciate that 'the efEcacy of 
her me- treatment depends upon the 
accuracy of the i n fomon  provided to 
the doctor." 
/ 
w 
- 
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&he c-btiisn c b ,  coum will 
fzaEltb"i\m ha* ellamus, vjrtlxllly 
u-bJ.e, discretion in de- 
tm~jv~*m on a case-by-case b&. 
The Eacts of this case demonstrate the 
amrphoua nature of a tr~1~~0rthhe.s 
inquiry Tme, Mark Uly admitted to 
pmr&ipslrion in a series of crimes. Bur the 
"ro& of cimmstanccs that surround the 
miking of the statement" (see Idaho v. 
Wrght, W7 U.S. 805,820 [1990]), raises 
npmemus fictors - whch ,we assume 
petiiioner will present to this Court - that 
mght phusibly account for Mark LiUy 
falsely incriminating his brother. 
It cannot be fair to deprive a defendant 
of Ehe ancient right to face his accuser 
because a judge mixes some dubious 
generahations about human behavior - 
such as that one is unlikely to make a 
statement confessing a crime unless the 
entirety of the statement is substantidy 
true, or that brothers would not falsely 
incriminate each other - with h~ own 
view of the surrounding facts to conclude 
that the statement is probably true. Hearsay 
excepti~ns may hinge on such cliches, but 
a defkdant should have the right to 
challenge h~ accuser in the courtroom 
when the out-of-court statement falls 
within the perimeter of core values on 
which the Srxth Amendment right of 
confrontation rests. 
Law of confrontation 
independent of the 
law of hearsay 
Neither the "firmly rootedn test nor the 
requirement of "particularized guarantees 
of trustworthinessn provides a satisfactory 
test of confrontation that guides the lower 
courts or ensures that a defendant is 
accorded the procedural protections 
guaranteed by thdisixth Amendment. 
A categorical approach would exclude 
in-custody confessions unless the 
defendant was afforded his light-of 
confrontation. Our arguments inhcate that 
the constitutional ri& of confrontation is 
independent of, and should not be made 
subonbate to, the ordinary law of hearsay 
We contend that applicability of the f 
confrontation clause to an out-of-court 
statement doemc.~ depend on a murtb 
~SRSSIUZIX of the ~ ~ t e m ~ m ' s  ~gliabiliy 
Rather8 the c k  stam a fundamental 
procddural protection, and applies 
categorically to certain type of statements. 
In this section, we will present two 
propopals for defining h t  category of 
statements. W e  we urge the Court to 
declare that such a mgorica1 right exists, 
we do-not believe that to decide this case 
the Court must choose one of tkse 
variants, or any other pafticular proposal, 
or that it must define the boundaries of the 
clause with pnxkion. Under any reasonable 
demarcation of the category of statements 
covered by h e  clause, accomplice 
confessions like the one here of Mark LiUy 
he at the heart of the clause, and nowhere 
near the edge. 
A tedmmhl view. Under one approach, 
the key question is this: In making the 
statement at issue, should the declarant be 
deemed to have been as a witness within 
the meaning of the confrontation clause? 
If not, then under this approach the clause 
does not apply. On the other hand, if the 
declarant was acting as a witness, and the 
accused has not had an adequate 
opportunity to confront her, then the 
statement may not be admitted against the 
accused (unless he has forfeited the 
conbntatim right by causing the witness's 
unavabbdity). See Akhil Reed Amar, The 
Constiiution and Crimid Pmedune 125-31 
(1997) and Richard D. Friedman, 
"Confrontation: The Search for Basic 
Principles," 86 Georgetown Law Jatfrnal 
1011, 1022-26 (1998). 
rhls view finds obvioik support in the 
language of the confrontation clause - 
whlch speaks in unqualified terms of the 
accused's right to confront "the witnesses 
againstn the accused. It is supported also by 
the history of the clause and in its manifest 
role in our system of uiminal procedure. 
As we have shown, the clause 
constitutionalizes a long-established 
procedural rule governing the manner by 
which witnesses give testimony for 
adjudication in the Anglo-American 
system, a manner far different Erom the 
inquisitod style used by Continental 
courts. 
When, then, should a declarmt be 
deemed to have acted as a witness in 
ma- a statement against an accused? 
So long as the Court retains its 
trusw~ahin~viavof 
confrontation, and does not 
abandon Laein fam of a 
rule that certainkindsd 
confessions never sabisfy tbe 
confrontation clause, courts will 
continue to haveemmm, 
virtually unmdewablle, discretion 
in determining trustwo&e58 1 
Put another way, when is her statement 
testimonial? Obviously she acts as a 
witness if she testified in court, at the trial 
of the defendant; the defendant then has a 
right to be present at the trial and cross- 
examine her. It is hardly less obvious that 
the declarant is acting as a witness if she 
gives the prosecution an affidavit, or 
otlienvlse makes a formal pre-trial 
statement under oath about the alleged 
crime to the authorities. (Statements made 
at a grand jury proceeding, therefore, 
should not be usable at tiial unless the 
declarant testifies and is subject to cross- 
examination. This rule would eliminate the 
current practice of subjecting grand jury 
statements to a "particularized guarantees 
of trustworthiness" analysis when they are 
offered under a residual hearsay exception.) 
Indeed, it has often been sald that e x  parte 
affidavits and other "formalized testimonial 
materials" were the focus of the 
confrontation clause. 
Justices Scalia and Thomas explicitly 
included "confessions" in the category of 
"fonnalized testimonial materials." Thus, 
their analysis would - properly - bring 
statements like Mark Lilly's in this case 
within the ambit of the confrontation 
clause. A better and less strained approach 
to the same result, we suggest, is to 
recognize that formality is not a 
prerequisite to deeming a statement 
testimonial, and so bringing it witlzin that 
ambit. Rather, formality is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for making 
testimony acceptable. In particular, the oath 
is perhaps the oldest and most nearly 
universal requirement for the giving of 
testimony If unsworn confessions to the 
authorities were not deemed to be 
statements within the protection of the 
confrontation clause, then we would have 
a system in which the authorities could 
take statements for use at Lrial, made by 
declarants knowing they would be so used 
- testimony in any real sense of the word 
- absent not only confrontalion but also 
 he basic protection of the oath; indeed, the 
authorities would have an incentive to take 
the statement without the oath, simply so 
that the confrontalion clause could not be 
invoked. Thus, it appears that statements 
made knowingly, even informally, LO the 
authorities investigating a crime should be 
considered testimonial and so within the 
coverage of  he confrontation clause. 
In short, under the testimonial approach, 
this is an easy case. Ivlark Lilly's custodial 
confession lies aL the core of  he 
confrontation case, not near its fringes. 
A prosecutorial restraint view. A 
somewhat different focus rephrases the key 
question to ask whether tlze govellm~en[ 
participated in making the declarant a 
witness against the defendant. This 
approach views the confrontation clause as 
integral to a central objective of the Bill of 
Fhghts - to restrain the capricious use of 
governmental power. The colonists were 
well aware that the criminal law is a 
powerful tool in controlling perceived 
enemies of the state, and knew of the 
potency and secrecy with which a 
government can act. To counter these 
dangers, out-of-court statements procured 
by the prosecution or police, or their 
agents, should stand on a different footing 
than statements obtained without 
governmental intrusion. Requiring 
confrontation when the prosecution has 
played a part in producing the evidence 
enables the public to scrutinize the process 
by which the government is exercising its 
power, and complements the other rights 
that the Sixth Amendment grants - trial 
by jury, a public trial, specification of the 
charges, and right to counsel. 
Under this approach, confrontation 
protects the defendant against statements 
that the government might elicit through 
its enormous power to coerce or induce. If 
confrontation is not required, the 
government has the huge advantage of 
choosing whether to offer the contents of 
the statement through the testimony of the 
often discreditable declarant, or through 
the testiinony of a presumptively upright 
person involved in law enforcement 
(assuming a hearsay exception otherwise 
applies). 
There may be instances in which the 
prosecutorial restraint model might yleld a 
different result than the testimonial 
approach. But this is not such a case. Mark 
Lilly's in-custody statement to the police 
falls squarely within the ambit of the 
confrontation right a prosecutorial restraint 
approach would grant. 
A ca~egorical approach is consistent 
with the results reached by the Court in its 
prior decisions. Plainly, the approach to the 
confrontation clause that we suggest and 
the doctrine enunciated by the Court are 
difierent analytically Our approach is, 
however, consistent with all, or virlually 
all, of the restilk reached by the Court. 
Indeed, we believe that, though the Cour~ 
has not consciously articulated our 
approach, its decisions have reflected the 
force of that approach. We do no1 contend, 
of course, that adoption of our approach 
will answer all questions under the 
confrontation clause or that il will 
eliminate all difficult cases. But some cases 
that have appeared troublesome to the 
Court become vely straightfonvard under 
our approach. 
First consider Pointer Texas, 380 U.S. 
400 (1965), the case that first established 
that the confrontation right is a 
fundamental one incorporated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, its companion 
Douglas v Alabainn, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), 
and Lee v Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986). 
These cases all had two features. First, in 
each of these cases, the declaration at issue 
was a statement knowingly made in a 
judicial proceeding or to investigative 
authorities, providing information material 
to a criminal investigation. Thus, under 
any variation of the approach we have 
presented, the declarants must be deemed 
to have been witnesses within the meaning 
of the confrontation clause. Indeed, in both 
Do~iglns and Lee, as in this case, the 
declaration was the confession of an alleged 
accomplice. Second, in these cases the 
accused did not have an adequate 
opportunity to confront the witness. Thus, 
in each of these three cases the conclusion 
is easy that the accused's confrontation 
rights were violated - without any need 
for anything like the dubious reliability 
analysis of Lee. 
By contrast, in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 
74 (1970), and United States v. Inadi, 475 
U.S. 387 (1986), the first of these features 
was not present, so statements appear not 
LO have been wi~hin the realm of the 
confrontation clause as we have defined it. 
In Dutton, the statement was made by one 
piisoner to another. In Inadi, the statements 
were made by one member of a conspiracy 
to another, without any inducelnent by 
agents of the prosecution; they were not 
testifying but carrylng on the ordinary 
business of the conspiracy Thus, in neither 
of these cases were the declarants acting as 
witnesses when they made the statements 
in issue. A similar argument has force with 
respecl to at least some ol the statements 
made by the four-year-old declarant - 
such as those to her babysitter and to her 
mother - in Wlzite v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 
(1992). 
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, &err w, the s a n d  agna of the this &&dm ifi unfimnate. If d e d  to I 
p&~e"r-~glm-Lee line has net been clechratim against intenzit hi general - 
m t ,  hause the accused was held to md neither the Courtb dedsicm nor the 
hnd m ,adequate ogportunity to rule aves any basis for declining to do so 
& m & ~ ~ l t  h e  wigless befarre trial. That was - it limits the u s e m  sf a much-used 
se in ,Mam Y, United States, 156 U.S. 237 exception acrofs a broad range of cases, - 
(18!?5), QIX tof the oldest cmfkntation civil as well as criminal; the interpretation 
which the witness had in was far more restrictive b n  
ect to ccrose-examination, at most prior authorities suggested. 
auwed:5 &st trial but died before his W~Uiamon is lhus a good indication that 
d #t&x'l. And in Calfjomia v. Green, 399 the melding of the confrontation clause 
U6,149 (1970), the accuse$ had an and of hearsay doctrine thds not only to 
qppomnity at a prelunary hearing to denigrate the constitutional protection, but 
examine the witness, who appeared at trial also to make hearsay law unduly rigid. 
' but was then uncooperative. The Court will, we believe, continue to 
In Nattejr, the pseeution could not make deckbns that reflect the demands of 
have produced the witness at the trial in the confrontation right, becaw that right 
question, and in Gr-em the prosecution did is such a fundamental, and intuitively 
pmduee him. In other cases, though the appealing, aspect of d-d jurisprudence. 
accused had some previous opportunity to But if it continues to use heamy law as the 1 
examine the witness, hestill raised a vehicle for those decisions, it will be 
confkntatian clause argument that the unable to articulate either a robust I 
prosecution had not done what it could to understanding of the constitutional right or 
secure the live testimony of the witness at a sensible, truth-oriented, doctrine of 
the trial & question. In Barber v. Page, 390 hearsay hfessor Bickard D. F r i e h  eamed a 
U.S. 719 (1968), the Court agreed that the B.A. and a] .  D. frmn Haward and a D.Phil, in 
prosecpion had failed to make a good faith . modern history* w o r d  Universi~. His 
attempt to secure the attendance of the meanhfocuses principdy on evidence and 
witness at trial; in addition, it held that in --Supreme Court history. He is the g m d  editor the cimmstances the defendants prior of Thk New Wzgmore, a multi-vohune tnxthe opportunity to examine the witness had on evidence, and has been designated to write not been sufficient. Plainly, the holdmg of the volume on the Hughes Court in the Oliver Barber is not inconsistent with our I ; Wendell H o b  Devise, a histay of he 
approach. Even assuming @e defendant The Court ,could reach the proper result United States SUP= Court R o f m ~ r  
had a previous oppodty to confront in this - without revisiting ie appmach Friedman clewforJudge Iwng R h f m a n  the witness, it is still preferabl'e that the to the confrontation clause. But to do so of fie US- Court 0fA~~edf'r the ~ e ~ d  
witness testify live, and the prose~tion would just be ta put one more patch on a Cimk He was t h  an ass-for 
O"*t make to secure tattered garment. It would, leave lower fim ofPau2, Weirs, R@ilm&Wharton & his attendance. In Mancusi u Slubbs, 408 coum on how to apply the Garrison in New York City. He c m  to Eht 
204 (19721, and Ohio V. bbe*, 448 because there would still be no Law S~hooZ CIS a visiting pmfessor in 1987fim 
u.s- 56 (lg80), the that the constant guide to the Cows decisions. It &~do20 h s~hool ~ d j o i ~ e d  thc wltP 
pros&utionS efforts were satisfactory: would continue to make effective appellate fml!Y in 1988. Again, nothing in these cases is review impractical, because decisions 
inconsistent with our approach: Given that would still depend so heady on of 
the accused had previously had an the evidence in the particular case. It 
adequate opportunity to examine the would require continuing reliance on 
witness, if the witness was unavadable at hearsay doctrine to do the work that 
trial despite good faith efforts, the should be performed by the confrontation 
confrontation clause should not preclude ch -to the detriment of both. It 
use of the earlier testimony would mean that the CourtS stated 
Finally, we note Williamson u United of decision lack persuzive power. States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994). A And it would miss out on the great 
straightforward result would have principle underlying the clause, one 
 cognized that admission of the statement intepl to the Amendment and with 
at issue, an accomplicek confession to the robt, both deep snd broad: men the police, presumptively violated the government prosecutes an accused, the 
confrontation clause1 Instead, the Court accused has a right to codmnt hued a highly restrictive construction of 
"the witnesses against him." 
the hearsay exception for declarations The decision of the Virginia Supreme 
agSlbt penal intemt, e ~ p m d  in Federal Court should be 
Rule af Evidence 804(b)(3). The basis for 
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